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Robert A. Millikan meets the credibility revolution: comment on
Harrison (2013), ‘ﬁeld experiments and methodological intolerance’1
Nathaniel T. Wilcox*
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, CA, USA
Millikan’s famous oil drop experiment is scrutinized from the viewpoint of the
methodological dicta of the credibility revolution.
Keywords: Millikan; oil drop experiment; credibility revolution
Glenn Harrison’s (2013) initial reductio – that laboratory classics (e.g., Smith, 1962)
involving no crucial randomization but plenty of control are somehow not experiments
under the dictates of the credibility revolution – has to make any sane scholar laugh.
But are there really people who believe things like that? You bet. In nearly the same
breath, Harrison quotes Gerber and Green (2012, p. 9 n. 7) as follows:
Readers with a background in the natural sciences may ﬁnd it surprising that random assign-
ment is an integral part of the deﬁnition of a social science experiment. Why is random
assignment often unnecessary in experiments in, for example, physics? Part of the answer is
that the ‘subjects’ in these experiments – e.g. electrons – are more or less interchangeable,
and so the method used to assign subjects to treatment is inconsequential. Another part of the
answer is that lab conditions neutralize all forces other than the treatment.
Harrison judges this is ‘Nonsense, at several levels, but not worth dissecting since read-
ers in social sciences are not expected to be puzzled by this’. Perhaps, yet this quote
from Gerber and Green made me wonder: Is great empirical practice in the natural
sciences so very different from our own? Is it better or worse? Would we recognize its
ways as our own, or not? Would the prophets of the so-called credibility revolution of
empirical economics approve of those ways, or not? If not, would or should natural sci-
entists care much?
In high school physics, my classmates and I tried our hands at balancing a tiny
charged drop of latex in the air between two electriﬁed plates, mostly convincing us
that our teacher had a cruel sense of humor. Otherwise I forgot all about Millikan’s
famous ‘oil drop’ experiments until I read Gerber and Green’s assurances about the nat-
ural sciences. Curiosity took me back to Millikan’s (1911) ﬁrst full published report
(hereafter M11) on his attempt to (a) prove that electric charge is quantized and (b)
measure that elementary electrical charge. Franklin (1981, p. 191) believes that
‘Millikan regarded the question of charge quantization as settled’ by M11, but there
were still lingering criticisms of that conclusion – as well as Millikan’s measurement of
*Email: nwilcox@chapman.edu
1I’m in debt to Nancy Cartwright, Allan Franklin and Christopher Ruf for their help navigating
philosophical, physical and historical matters, but the usual disclaimer applies strongly – they’re
not responsible for my bloopers.
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the elementary charge. Millikan (1913) duly reported improved measurements and
some answers to critics (hereafter M13). Millikan won a Nobel prize for this work, so
perhaps it contains some of the essence of great experimental design and practice.
Here is the statistical essence of Millikan’s deceptively simple problem. We have
the linear regression of a dependent variable Yi, measured with errors ɛi, on an indepen-
dent non-negative variable Xi. This is the linear regression equation Yi = b + mXi + ɛi.
Ultimately, Millikan wants the most precise estimate b^ of the intercept b he can get
(according to standard physical theory, this intercept will be a known monotonic trans-
formation of the elementary charge Millikan seeks). Any regression text gives S^b, an
estimator of the standard error of b^, as
S^b ¼ N1=2S^eP; (1)
where
s^e ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPN
i¼1 e^
2
i
N2
r
(with e^i ¼ Yi  b^ m^Xi ), P ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
SSðXiÞ
SSðXiX Þ
q
, X ¼ N1PN
i¼1
Xi,
SS Xið Þ ¼
PN
i¼1
X 2i ; SS Xi  Xð Þ ¼
PN
i¼1
Xi  Xð Þ2, and
b^ and m^ are the OLS estimators of b and m.
How can Millikan make S^b small by experimental design and method? Aside
from increasing the sample size N, one avenue is to make S^e, the root-mean-square
error or RMSE, as small as possible, and Millikan puts many different efforts here.
The physical, mathematical path from Millikan’s observations (the measured speeds
of his oil drops) to the dependent variable Yi passes through functional forms contain-
ing several physical parameters that needed their own measurement, either by
Millikan’s team or other experimenters elsewhere (more on this shortly). Insuring the
precision of these other measurements was a central part of Millikan’s efforts to
reduce the measurement error variance in Yi. We can call those other measurements
covariates, since Millikan needs to control for them in order to properly interpret his
dependent speed measures and construct his dependent variable Yi from his primary
oil drop speed measurements.
The other major term in the expression for S^b is P ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
SSðXiÞ=SSðXi  X Þ
p
, the root
of the ratio of the uncentered and centered sums of squares of the independent variable X.
There is seemingly obvious advice here: Choose all the Xi equal to zero, reducing P to its
minimum possible value of 1, and make S^b depend solely on the RMSE S^e. Intuitively,
Robert should just run observations with Xi = 0 and nix the regression: He is only after the
intercept after all, the mean value of Y conditional on X = 0. At ﬁrst blush, there appears to
be no need to estimate the treatment effect of variations in X on Y. But the physics, and the
limitations of the observational technologies of Millikan’s day, preclude this: Observations
of Yi will have impossibly high measurement error variance for X near or at zero, or so
Millikan repeatedly argues and tries to illustrate with the help of his experiences with rela-
tively small but nonzero values of X. Shockingly, the inference Millikan wants to draw
concerns the conditional expectation of Y at a value of X that cannot be within his sample
range of X: Millikan is in the business of doing the impossible (or at least the statistically
doubtful). The central thing of physical interest, the intercept b, is unavoidably an out-of-
sample quantity – given the observational limitations of Millikan’s day. It will have to be
projected on the basis of estimated in-sample variations in E(Y|X) and enough (assumed)
local linearity. Indeed, we can view the term P in (1) as a ‘penalty’ exacted since the inter-
cept cannot actually be directly measured with observations at X = 0.
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The physics must eventually intrude on these mundane statistical musings. Once
Millikan brings an oil drop between his electric plates, he measures its speed under
two conditions. First, there is v1, the terminal speed at which drops fall under the force
of gravity (balanced by the buoyancy and retarding force of the air) with the plates
turned off; and there is v2, the speed at which drops rise under the added electromag-
netic force with the plates on (due to the total charge a drop carries during that mea-
surement). The drops themselves are thus Millikan’s observational units or ‘subjects’:
The subject may be electrons, but the subjects are oil drops.
Millikan repeatedly measures v1 and v2 for each drop, alternating between having
the plates off or on:
This operation is repeated and the speeds checked an indeﬁnite number of times, or until
the droplet catches an ion from among those which exist normally in the air … The fact
that an ion has been caught … is signaled to the observer by the change in the speed of
the droplet under the inﬂuence of the ﬁeld. (M11, p. 353)
So changes in total charge (brought about by naturally occurring ions) occur naturally
in a wholly uncontrolled way, and Millikan might have carried off his measurement
using only these uncontrolled variations in charge. However, Millikan does have a way
to induce partially controlled changes in total charge as well, by bringing a tube of
radium near the apparatus, and does so frequently: Millikan remarks that
This sort of a change was one which, after the phenomenon had once been got under
control, we could make at will in either direction; i.e. we could force charges of
either sign or in any desired number, within limits [my emphasis], upon a given drop.
(M11, p. 366)
The contrast between v1 and v2 measures the apparent total charge en on a drop, which
is further thought of as the product of the apparent elementary charge e1 and the total
number n of charges (electrons) carried. Here is Millikan’s ﬁrst pass at a formula (M11
p. 354 Equation 4) – elaborated later to account for a crucial nuisance (and this is why
I say apparent charge at this stage of the analysis):
en ¼ 43 p
9l
2
 1:5
g r qð Þ½ 0:5 v1 þ v2ð Þv
0:5
1
F : (2)
The actual procedure involves multiple rounds of measurement and computation for
each given drop. At the start of a new round, the charge on a given drop is changed
using the radium, a new measurement v2 is taken and a new value of en computed.
Doing this repeatedly, and appealing to the maintained hypothesis that e1 is constant
across rounds for a given drop, one may recover a maximum divisor e1 of the several
en ﬁgures that produces integer estimates of n (total electrons) carried by the drop for
all that drop’s measurement rounds. This e1 is the apparent elementary charge as deter-
mined by the behavior of a given drop: It is a ‘within-drop estimator’ of the apparent
elementary charge. It will need correcting for that crucial nuisance and we return to this
later: The ‘between-drops variation’ of these within-drop estimates will be central to
making this correction.
To use (2) to infer total charge from speeds, physical theory at Millikan’s time
demands knowledge of several other quantities. These are as follows:
μ = the coefﬁcient of viscosity of the air in Millikan’s apparatus;
g = the gravitational force in Millikan’s apparatus (Franklin, 1981, p. 187);
σ = the density of an oil drop in Millikan’s apparatus;
Journal of Economic Methodology 3
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ρ = the density of the air in Millikan’s apparatus; and
F = the strength of the electrical ﬁeld surrounding the drop in Millikan’s apparatus.
Initially, I thought most of these would be among those mythical context-invariant
constants of the universe I have heard about, measured accurately with vanishing
error. But this was not to be. Three of these – μ, σ, and ρ – vary with temperature,
and Ryerson Hall was drafty in Millikan’s day: In the ﬁrst experiment, Millikan
needed careful air temperature records and these varied from 19.9 to 27.8 C across the
distinct drops used for calculations (M11, p. 384, Table 14). Millikan successfully
controlled temperature to a much smaller range of 1.1 C around 23 C in his second
experiment, but still took account of that smaller variation when making calculations
(M13, pp. 134–135, Table 20).
Millikan has strong concerns about sources of variance in μ (the viscosity of air)
as well as its mean at given temperatures. He says his measurement of the elementary
charge will be ‘limited in accuracy only by that attainable in the measurement of the
coefﬁcient of viscosity of air (M11, p. 350)’ and that ‘This factor certainly introduces
as large an element of uncertainty as inheres anywhere in the oil-drop method (M13,
p. 112)’. Given prior knowledge available at his time, Millikan chose this formula for
estimating μT, the viscosity of air at temperature T:
lT ¼ lTr þ 0:000000493  T  Trð Þ (3)
where
T = temperature (deg C.) in the apparatus;
Tr = a reference temperature (deg C.); and
lTr = a prior estimate of the viscosity of air at the reference temperature T
r.
To put (3) to work, Millikan needs to select or create a reasonable prior estimate of
lTr along with a reasonable guess about the ‘likely error’ in it (its irreducible uncer-
tainty at his time). Millikan settles on a value and likely error of μ15 for the ﬁrst study,
depending on others’ estimates and his own judgment as to which estimates are most
reliable (M11, pp. 385–387). For the second study, a different value and likely error of
μ23, based on two measurements by Millikan’s team in their own laboratory, was used
(M13, pp. 112–115).
Millikan used an array of power cells to create ﬁeld strengths F ranging from about
8000 to 3000 v cm−1 in M11 (p. 352), with F gradually falling as an experimental ses-
sion lengthened and the power cells discharged. In the second experiment, Millikan
arranged for much closer control of ﬁeld strength, employing a 5300-volt storage bat-
tery with a vastly slower discharge rate of 5–10 v h−1, but ﬁeld strength still varied
across the 58 drops from about 3250–1050 v cm−1 (M13, pp. 134–135, Table 20) and
still required frequent measurement for subsequent calculations.
I have not touched on the calibration of instruments, but still we can enjoy all this
work aimed at the reduction in measurement error, the resulting smaller S^e, and ﬁnally
the prize – the resulting reduction in S^b. But now I must elaborate on the penalty P –
why it exists at all, and things Millikan did to reduce it. The basic trouble stems from
the behavior of relatively small oil drops. Equation (2) comes from two basic physical
laws, Newton’s second law (force is mass times acceleration) and Stokes’ law. Stokes’
law describes the ‘retarding force’ with which a continuous medium of viscosity μ
resists a sphere of radius a moving through it, such as an oil drop moving through the
air. The trouble comes from drops of sufﬁciently small radius. Being a mixture of
molecules, air is not really continuous. At any given air pressure p, smaller oil drops
are increasingly likely to slip between air molecules, dropping the retarding force of
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the air below that speciﬁed by Stokes’ law which, after all, is meant for a continuous
medium. Because of this, Equation (2) is not exactly right and is increasingly wrong
for smaller drops and/or at lower air pressures. We can summarize this by the product
of the drop radius and the air pressure and say that Equation (2) is most accurate when
ap is relatively large and increasingly misleading as ap approaches zero. In Equation
(1), the independent variable X is simply the reciprocal of ap. So as ap gets large, X
goes to zero, Stokes’ law holds more perfectly, and we might measure the intercept in
Equation (1) directly rather than by an out-of-sample projection. Why cannot Millikan
arrange observation at sufﬁciently large ap?
Under the forces of gravity and viscosity of air alone, faster drops are bigger drops.
The force of gravity is proportional to drop mass, but the retarding force of viscosity is
proportional to drop radius – and drop radius is less than proportional to drop mass.
Therefore, as a drop’s mass (and hence its radius) increases, so too its terminal velocity
increases. Air pressure held constant, then, a relatively large ap means a relatively fast-
moving drop. Keep in mind that the technology for measuring drop speed is very
human: The experimenter watches for the time a drop takes to traverse a pre-measured
short distance, using a chronograph or a stopwatch. The speed of fast-moving drops
will be particularly difﬁcult to measure accurately by this technique. Millikan (M11, p.
382) says that ‘When the velocities are … very large the time determination becomes
unreliable …’ Throughout both papers, the point recurs frequently: ‘… it was thought
preferable to make a considerable number of observations … on drops small enough to
make [v1] determinable with great accuracy …’ (M13, p. 139).
Millikan is convinced that a fast drop, which is a big drop, is a bad drop from the
perspective of keeping S^b small. So much for choosing X close to zero. But Millikan is
also convinced that a slow drop, which is a small drop, is also a bad drop. We have
already seen that Stokes’ law breaks down for sufﬁciently small drops, but there is
another problem with the smallest ones: ‘When the velocities are very small residual
convection currents [in the air] and Brownian movements introduce errors’ (M11, p.
382). So there is a Goldilocks range of just right speeds that Millikan decides to give
particular credence. Although a handful of slower and faster drops will make the ﬁnal
cut,
[F]or the end here sought, namely, the most accurate possible determination of e, it was
found desirable to keep the [inverse of the speed v1] for the most part between 10 s and
40 s, in order to avoid chronograph errors on the one hand and Brownian movement irreg-
ularities on the other. (M13, p. 133)
I wish we knew how ten and forty seconds got privileged in this way, but we do not.
All we really know is that there are good qualitative reasons for regarding the slowest
and fastest drop measurements with suspicion. But make no mistake: Millikan is, with
this (somewhat fuzzy) range requirement, selecting his subjects on the basis of values
of their observed dependent measures. I see ﬁngers wagging and scandalized Victorian
grandmother looks on certain faces, yet this gross violation of alleged rules of method
is closely reasoned and eminently reasonable. This selection issue is particularly amus-
ing since we also know that Millikan selected and rejected many other drops for much
less apparent reasons (Franklin, 1981; Holton, 1978). But after nearly 40 years of tut-
tutting over that other selection of drops by Millikan, this much plainer selection –
right there for all to see in the published work – has attracted no similar censure,
though a sufﬁciently pedantic second-year econometrics grad student would happily
give you a gratuitous earful about selection on values of the dependent variable.
Journal of Economic Methodology 5
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To recap, considerations on likely sources of measurement error imply that the
range of drop speeds that will get used in the analysis, and hence the drop radii a that
will get used, must be limited to some range. This means that X in Equation (1), the
reciprocal of ap, will have a limited range as well. To my mind, Millikan’s greatest
design innovation in passing from the 1911 article to the 1913 article was seeing how
he could make experimentally controlled variations in air pressure p a huge advantage
in his effort to reduce S^b. In the 1911 experiment, uncontrolled variations in air pres-
sure were simply nuisance variance to be measured and adjusted for in calculations,
and the vast majority of variation in ap available for estimation came from the naturally
occurring heterogeneity of drop sizes. In the 1913 experiment, controlled variations in
air pressure would instead be an ally, since these allowed Millikan to vastly extend the
range of the independent variable X ¼ apð Þ1 beyond the speed (and hence radius) lim-
its Millikan imposed on himself to limit measurement error. Extending the range of X
in this way permits very pronounced reductions in the penalty term
P ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
SSðXiÞ=SSðXi  X Þ
p
that appears in the expression for S^b in Equation (1).
Stokes’ law says that the retarding force on a sphere of radius a traveling through a
continuous medium of viscosity μ at speed v is 6πμav. Millikan’s ﬁx-up for the non-con-
tinuous nature of air is simply to discount (divide) this force by a factor 1þ c apð Þ1, a
bald linearization of whatever functional form the breakdown in Stokes’ law might take,
given ﬂesh with a single unknown parameter c (M13, pp. 110–111, 133–138). With this
done, we have this relationship between the actual elementary charge e and the apparent
elementary charges e1 as computed for the drops using Equation (2) as described earlier:
e2=31 ¼ e2=3 1þ c apð Þ1
h i
¼ e2=3 þ ce2=3 apð Þ1 (4)
With Equation (4), we now have the simple linear regression of Equation (1). The
dependent variable is Yi ¼ e2=31 , the independent variable is Xi ¼ apð Þ1, the slope
parameter is m = ce2/3 and, as promised, the intercept b = e2/3 is a known monotonic
transformation of the elusive elementary charge.
What have I learned about Millikan’s methods? Consider the subjects – the oil
drops. First, they are most deﬁnitely not interchangeable: Subjects are heterogeneous in
both controlled and uncontrolled ways. The drops come in different sizes, carrying dif-
ferent and only partially controlled charges, with the charges changing (within subject)
from round to round and observed under deliberately varied (between subject) condi-
tions of air pressure (in M13 only). Second, the heterogeneity of the subjects – both
controlled and uncontrolled – is crucially central to the identiﬁcation strategy. Because
it is not possible to accurately measure the behavior (terminal speed) of the theoreti-
cally ideal oil drop (e.g., one the size of a basketball at a hundred atmospheres) as it
traverses the centimeter or so between the electrical plates, an out-of-sample projection
will need to be made; and sample variation in the drops’ values of apð Þ1 is crucially
central to this projection. Nor is that all: Third, heterogeneity of subjects is crucially
central to making the standard error of the central estimate small. In Millikan’s ﬁrst
experiment, the naturally occurring variation in drop radii is almost the entire variation
available for estimating the central correction to Stokes’ law. In his second experiment,
Millikan deliberately uses air pressure variations to increase the range of the crucial
covariate apð Þ1 so as to reduce the penalty term P in Equation (1). This may all come
as a surprise to acolytes of the credibility revolution: Among them, heterogeneity only
plays an infernal role in a Manichean story about the damned nuisance it can be as
seekers follow the one true path to unbiasedness.
6 N.T. Wilcox
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This is as good a place as any to notice how obsessed Millikan is with minimum
variance estimation rather than unbiasedness. You would have to read him very care-
lessly to miss this. I have said nothing at all about calibration of instruments, but many
pages of the two papers are on nothing else. I have mentioned the search for the very
best parameter estimates for the interpretation and use of temperature (and viscosity
and density) covariates. The beautiful use of air pressure variation to extend the range
of apð Þ1 has everything to do with reducing the central standard error by means of
design artiﬁce and nothing at all to do with unbiasedness.
The prophets of the credibility revolution take a dim view of functional form
assumptions and instruct those who would follow them to avoid things like Millikan’s
bald linearization of the functional discrepancy between Stokes’ law and reality for tiny
drops. They also take a very dim view of selection of observations on observed values
of the dependent variable, which Millikan does, and with an air of contempt for anyone
who dares to disagree: ‘[I]t is scarcely legitimate to include such observations in the
ﬁnal mean’, Millikan practically thunders to his reader (M11, pp. 382–383). To repeat,
Millikan is all about minimizing estimation variance. If omitting those particular obser-
vations (those with speeds outside the range of ten to forty seconds) might bias his esti-
mate, well, he is too busy trying to minimize ‘likely error’ to give such worries any
hearing at all, whether fair or not.
I relish Millikan’s clever use of both within-subject (charge) and between-subject
(air pressure) treatment variation to get his estimation job done. When I read the sacred
texts of the credibility revolution, it sometimes seems as if there is an unwritten but
strong taboo against within-unit treatment variation. You see this most clearly when
people claim the entire problem of social science empiricism is our inability to observe
the same subject in two (or more) distinct treatments, all else held constant. I am sure
this is a real problem for certain kinds of treatments, such as ‘unvaccinated’ and ‘vacci-
nated’. But much ﬁne experimental work rests solely on within-subject variation, along
with a large amount of supporting work to look for violations of its own necessary con-
ditions for validity. Millikan happily maintains the hypothesis that e1 stays constant for
any given drop as he charges, and then recharges, that drop across rounds of observa-
tion with that drop. I get the sense that a strictly constructed credibility revolution fol-
lower would not happily do so. How do I really know that e1 stays constant, within
drops across time, I hear them asking in arch fashion? I can only answer that I do not,
but from this and similar working assumptions, a great empirical natural science was
gradually built, and many Nobel laureates crowned. Empirical physics seems to
get along just ﬁne ignoring and frequently violating most of the strictures of the credi-
bility revolution.
I also learned that Millikan’s laboratory methods did not ‘neutralize all forces other
than the treatment’ (Gerber & Green, 2012, p. 9 n. 7). It would be more correct to say
that Millikan did what he could to get rid of unwanted variations in temperature, volt-
age, and so forth, but in the end, he carefully measured remaining variations in these
crucial covariates as carefully as possible so that their remaining variance could be
taken into account in constructing the apparent elementary charges e1. What I see in
Millikan, then, is a mixed pragmatic approach: Design away whatever nuisance vari-
ance we can, and then measure and correct for what remains. It does not appear to me,
then, that natural scientists have magically made some great escape from the need to
take overt account of variation in disturbing causes. Perhaps the (widespread?) belief
that they have made some such escape is a byproduct of (widespread) sloppy rhetoric
Journal of Economic Methodology 7
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about the meaning and extent of experimental control, but I rather doubt that the scien-
tists themselves have any illusions about this matter.
All in all, I think Millikan’s empirical methods closely resemble those of conven-
tional structural econometricians – the very people who are under assault by the credi-
bility revolutionaries. I have no trouble couching Millikan’s basic statistical problem in
the homely terms of ordinary least squares. His design choices, methods, and obses-
sions are all very easy to understand from that banal structural econometrics perspective
– whether we agree perfectly with them or not. Like a conventional structural econome-
trician, Millikan lets his inferences depend on pragmatic assumptions, such as a lin-
earization of an unknown function. Like a conventional structural econometrician,
Millikan depends on measurement and overt conditioning, rather than randomized
assignment, to control for disturbing causes.
I also see obvious differences between Millikan’s empirical practices and those of
all economic empiricists, whether revolutionary or conventional. The role of sharable
empirical knowledge stands out. Especially in his ﬁrst experiment, Millikan depends
heavily on others’ measurements – speciﬁcally, for the viscosity of air and how it var-
ies with temperature. Millikan is able to draw on 10 published studies of the viscosity
of air. Complaints that economists do not have any constants are common, but notice
the conditional nature of physicists’ so-called constants: To know the viscosity of the
air in his apparatus, Millikan needs not only prior estimates of an intercept and a slope,
but also the temperature in his apparatus. Temperature itself had to be ‘invented’ across
several centuries (Chang, 2007): We may not even now have the relevant covariates for
doing the kind of conditioning we might like to. But I come away from Millikan with
a strong sense that we would not have rich empirical social sciences until we have
knowledge that travels between studies, even if only conditionally in the same way that
the viscosity of air travels between physical laboratories conditional on temperature.
Although much of the rhetoric of the credibility revolution focuses on unbiased esti-
mation, it is fair to say that most users of its tools are more interested in hypothesis-
testing than measurement. To put it somewhat differently, unbiased estimation is mostly
in the service of an ultimate hypothesis test. Millikan’s experiments are mostly about
measurement for its own sake and, in turn, Millikan depends very heavily on a large
number of studies measuring the viscosity of air. I have trouble seeing how an empiri-
cal social science obsessed with piecemeal hypothesis-testing, rather than measurement
and its useful generalization across contexts, will ever achieve broad empirical success
and wide applicability. I have trouble seeing how an obsession with the statistical
signiﬁcance of causal effects brings us much closer to generalizable knowledge, if we
cannot reliably condition the size of causal effects on reliably measurable covariates.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
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